Work ow management systems (WFMS) support the modeling and coordinated execution of processes within an organization. As advances in work ow management take place, they are also required to support security. This paper makes two major contributions to the area of work ow management. First, it shows how both mandatory and discretionary security can be incorporated into WFMS. Second, it provides a formal framework, based on Petri nets (PNs), for modeling work ows. Such a theoretical model is necessary for a standard conceptual representation as well as for analyzing the work ows. This paper rst presents a Petri Net based model, called Color Timed Petri Net (CTPN), which is capable of modeling the attributes of both multilevel and discretionary security.
Introduction
Work ows represent activities involved in a typical business, manufacturing or o ce environment. The various activities in a work ow can be separated into well de ned tasks. These tasks that make up the work ow in turn are usually related and dependent on one another, and therefore, are required to be executed in a coordinated manner. Thus a work ow can be represented as a partially ordered set of tasks tw 1 ; tw 2 ; : : :tw n . The task dependencies within a work ow are known as intra-work ow dependencies. In addition, dependencies exist among tasks that belong to di erent work ows, which are known as inter-work ow dependencies.
As advances in work ow management take place, they are also required to support security. Security is concerned with the ability to enforce a security policy governing the disclosure, modi cation or destruction of information. Both mandatory and discretionary access control are important in work ow management systems, and therefore, this paper addresses both these issues.
The basic model of multilevel security was rst introduced by Bell and LaPadula 7] . The Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model is stated in terms of objects (that hold data such as a le or a record) and subjects (active entities that manipulate objects). Every object is assigned a classi cation and every subject a clearance. Classi cations and clearances are collectively known as security classes (or levels) and are partially ordered. The BLP model comprises of the following two properties: (1) simple-security property: a subject is allowed to read an object only if the subject's security level is identical or higher than (denoted as ) the object's security level and (2) ?-property: a subject is allowed to write an object only if the subject's security level is identical or lower than (denoted as ) the object's security level. These two restrictions are intended to ensure that there is no ow of information from higher level objects to subjects at lower security levels 20]. Although they prevent direct ow of information from a high level to a low security level, they are not su cient to ensure that security is not compromised since it could be possible that leakage of information can occur through indirect means via covert channels. Covert channels are paths not normally meant for information ow that could nevertheless be used to signal information. They could occur as a subject at a higher security level delaying or aborting another subject at a lower security level. In a multilevel secure work ow, tasks (subjects) may belong to di erent security levels. Thus ensuring all the task dependencies, especially those from a high task to a low task, may compromise security. In order to ensure correctness and reliability, work ows are associated with a transaction model 24, 25] . This paper studies multilevel secure work ow transactions and propose a Color Timed Petri Net (CTPN) to model a work ow and shows how the task dependencies violating security can be automatically detected and prevented by building a Secure Petri Net (SPN) from CTPN.
Execution of the various tasks in a work ow can be carried out by humans, processes such as an application program, or a database management system. Discretionary security is required in work ow management systems to ensure that these tasks are executed by authorized subjects (users or processes). A suitable authorization model for work ows must therefore guarantee that authorization is granted to subjects on objects involved in the execution of the task only when the task starts and revoked as soon as the task nishes. Otherwise, a subject may possess authorization for time periods longer than required, which may compromise security. In order to make sure that authorized subjects are granted privileges on required objects only while the task is being executed, propagation of authorization (i.e. authorization ow) has to be synchronized with the work ow. None of the existing authorization models are capable of providing such synchronization. In this paper, we present a Work ow Authorization Model (WAM) that is capable of specifying authorizations so that subjects gain access to required objects only during the execution of the task, thus synchronizing the authorization ow with the work ow. To achieve this synchronization, we associate an Authorization Template (AT) with each task, which allows us to grant appropriate authorizations only when the task starts and to revoke them when the task nishes. We also show how our model can be extended to support role-based authorization and event-based authorization. We then demonstrate how synchronization of authorization ow and work ow can be accomplished using CTPN. The advantage of our Petri Net representation of multilevel work ows and work ow authorization model is that the abundant existing analysis techniques of Petri nets can be adapted for analyzing the properties of work ows. For example, safety problem 1 of authorization model and testing for the safety of a multilevel work ow (a work ow is said to be safe if it terminates in one of the speci ed acceptable termination states) can both be answered by conducting reachability analysis of Petri nets.
This paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this section gives justi cation for using Petri nets to model work ows and also provides a brief review of the relevant research. Section 2 presents the work ow model. Section 3 proposes CTPN suitable for modeling work ows and presents the Petri net representation of the work ow. Sections 4 and 5 present our approaches to enforcing mandatory and discretionary security in work ow management systems, respectively. Section 6 shows how CTPN can model the security attributes when both mandatory and discretionary security coexist. Section 7 discusses how Petri nets can be used to conduct the safety analysis of work ows and the proposed authorization model. Finally section 8 provides conclusions and future research directions.
Petri Net: A Suitable Tool for Modeling Work ows
Although several work ow management systems are under development, a formal framework for work ows still does not exist. Such a theoretical model is necessary for a standard conceptual representation as well as for analyzing work ows. Several researchers have recognized that Petri Net (PN) is a good tool to model work ows 21, 44] . Researchers have even envisioned that PN representation of work ows is similar to that of relational data model in the early seventies 44] . There are a number of reasons that make PNs an appropriate model to represent work ows, which are as follows:
1. Petri net is a graphical as well as a mathematical tool. As a mathematical tool, PNs enable analysis of the behavior of the work ow. Thus PN representation of MLS work ows as well as work ow authorization serve as a useful analysis tool. With respect to multilevel work ows, PN modeling allows us to test for their safety. Safety of a multilevel work ow can be examined by testing for reachability (see section 7 for a de nition) of its equivalent PN. With respect to the work ow authorization model, PN representation helps us address the safety problem in authorization models. The safety problem in work ow authorization models is equivalent to the reachability problem in its Petri net representation. Since Petri nets possess a rich set of analysis tools 32], PN modeling of work ows allows us to adapt the existing reachability analysis techniques. 2. As a graphical tool, PNs provide visualization (similar to ow charts, block diagrams, and the like) of the work ow process. Thus, PN is self-explanatory. If the system is modeled properly, no further verbal description is needed to aid in describing the work ow. Similar representations include state transition diagrams 34]. However, a 1 The safety problem can be stated as the following question: \Is there a reachable state in which a particular subject possesses a particular privilege for a speci c object?" state transition allows only one input and only one output for any given transition, and thus cannot be used to model synchronization of parallel activities. In summary, a PN can visualize and represent all properties, relations and restrictions in a work ow such as parallelism, concurrency, synchronization, control ow dependency and temporal relations. 3. PNs are capable of modeling priorities, concurrent reader-writer, and mutual exclusion, which are relevant in multilevel secure transaction processing where a lower level task must always be prioritized over higher level tasks to eliminate covert channels. 4. With respect to implementation, PN can be modeled at a conceptual level and can easily be tied into the design speci cation and algorithms. The nal PN can be treated as a test bed where the system can be simulated and validated before proceeding to detailed design and implementation.
Review of the Relevant Research
In recent years, research in work ow management has received considerable attention 34, 41, 21, 45, 28, 29, 6, 14, 16, 13, 3, 11, 48] . In addition, several interesting papers have been presented at a recent NSF sponsored workshop, Work ow and Process Automation in Information Systems: State-of-the-art and Future Directions 1]. Sheth and Runsinkiewicz 41, 34] discuss the issues involved in the execution of workows. In particular, they identify the problems associated with enforcing inter-task dependencies, atomicity requirements, properties of the entities executing a task, and their impact on execution. Attice et al. 6] propose a scheduler using nite-state automaton to analyze the dependencies and to achieve optimum scheduling, however this approach is computationally expensive. Krishnakumar et al. 28 , 29] present a work ow speci cation language WFSL to specify the inter-work ow dependencies, and task speci cation language (TSL) to specify intra-work ow dependencies. Zhang et al. 48 ] discuss a semi-atomicity approach where the tasks within a transaction are speci ed as a set of partial orders based on the commit dependencies among them, where each partial order provides a successful execution of the entire transaction. This has been proposed in the context of multidatabases where semi-atomicity allows each local site to autonomously maintain serializability and recoverability. Breitbart et al. 13] propose a semantic transaction model that supports semantic serializability and semantic atomicity. It identi es, for each transaction, the tasks that are semantically compatible; the remaining tasks are treated as con icting tasks. Semantic serializability ensures correct execution of con icting tasks only. With semantic atomicity, given that there exists a compensating task for each task, one task invocation is compensated by another task invocation if the return values of all the subsequent task invocations are the same as neither had ever executed.
In 21], Elmagarmid et al. describe a scheduler that uses a Predicate Petri Net model to identify the set of schedulable tasks of a work ow. The Predicate Petri Net is constructed based on the precedence predicate of each task and the partial order of the tasks in a work ow. Recently Adam, Atluri and Huang 2] have shown how Petri nets can be used in the analysis of work ows. Petri nets have been recognized in 40] as a best suited tool as work ow speci cation language. The commercial WFMS, X Work ow, which is developed by Olivetti out of the research system called DOMINO, models the process as state transitions in Petri nets.
It is important to note that both mandatory and discretionary security in work ow management have never been addressed before. A suitable authorization model for work ows must be capable of synchronizing authorization ow with the work ow process, but, to our knowledge, no such model can be found in the literature. Recently, several extensions to the basic authorization model can be seen in number of directions. One direction deals with increasing the expressive power of the authorization models and developing appropriate tools and mechanisms to support these models. These include introducing negative authorization 9, 33], role-based and task-based authorizations and separation of duties 18, 36, 37] , and temporal authorization 8]. Other direction deals with extending authorization models for advanced DBMSs such as object-oriented 23, 33, 10] and distributed 46, 35] DBMSs.
However, in these models, authorizations are in general speci ed with respect to object, right, subject granting right, subject receiving right, etc. These models study the propagation of authorization but do not tie it with any activity in the system, whereas authorization ow need to be tightly coupled to the work ow in order to ensure subjects possess authorizations only during the execution of the task. Also, Sandhu et al. 39] recognize that more sophisticated approaches than the conventional access control techniques are required when dealing with situations that control operation sequences.
Work ow Model
Three types of task dependencies in a work ow have been identi ed 34] to control the coordination among di erent tasks. They are: (1) Control ow dependencies: These are speci ed based on the task primitives such as begin, commit and abort of a task. An example of such dependency is \task tw i can begin only if task tw j has committed." (2) Value dependencies: These are speci ed such that a task can be controlled based on the output value generated by another task. These dependencies are of the form, \if the output of tw i is equal to x, then begin tw j " or \tw j can begin if tw i is a success (semantically)." 2 (3) External dependencies: They control the execution of tasks through external variables.
All the above three types of task dependencies can either be static or dynamic in nature. In the static case, the work ow transaction is de ned well in advance to its actual execution, whereas dynamic dependencies develop as the work ow progresses through its execution 42]. Task dependencies may exist among tasks within a work ow transaction (intra-work ow) or between two di erent work ow transactions (inter-work ow).
Types of Task Dependencies

Control-ow Dependencies
These are based on the task primitives. Control-ow dependencies may even pass data to other tasks; we identify them as control-ow dependencies with data-ow.
A control-ow dependency is of the form: A comprehensive list of task dependencies based on these three task primitives, namely, begin, commit and abort, can be found in 22, 17] , which include commit, weak-abort, exclusion, force-commit-on-abort, serial, begin-on-abort and weak-begin-on-commit dependencies.
Control-ow Dependencies with Data-ow:
A control-ow dependency with data-ow is of the form:
A task tw j can enter state st j only after task tw i enters state st i and tw i passes values of data objects to tw j . In these dependencies, in addition to the control ow, there could even be information ow (or data ow) between the tasks where a task needs to wait for data from another task. Notice that control-ow dependency with data-ow is meaningful only for limited combinations of st i and st j . For example, st i and st j can be \commit" and \begin," respectively, but cannot be \begin" and \commit."
Value Dependencies
Unlike control ow dependencies, value dependencies specify task dependencies based on the output value generated by the task, where the value could even be the semantic success or failure of the task. 3 ACTA is a framework that allows one to specify the e ects of transactions on other transactions in rst-order logic based formalism, which is based on the transaction management primitives.
A value dependency, in general, is as follows: Given any two tasks tw i and tw j , tw j can enter state st j only if task tw i generates an output of some value x.
In many cases, the value can simply be 0 or 1, representing the task failure or success, respectively. Note that failure of a task does not necessarily mean its abort. A task may still semantically fail despite the fact that it has committed. An example of value dependency would be \if the temperature at the end of the execution of task tw i is greater than 95 0 F, then task tw j has to be started; otherwise task tw k has to be started." In this example, a temperature lower than 95 0 F may be undesirable and thus may mean failure even if the task successfully commits. Failure and success really depend on the semantics of the work ow.
External Dependencies
Unlike the previous two dependencies, external dependencies are caused by external variables such as time.
An external dependency is of the form: A task t i can enter state st i only if a certain condition c j is satis ed where the parameters in c j are external to the work ow.
Although these dependencies can be speci ed based on any external parameter, since they occur in most cases with time as a parameter, we consider only external dependencies based on time. For the purpose of modeling (later in section 3.1.3), we categorize temporal dependencies as absolute and relative. Absolute dependencies are solely controlled by the external factors. For example, an absolute temporal dependency may be speci ed as "the execution of task tw i can start only at 10:00am." A relative temporal dependency can be speci ed as external parameters but are controlled by the internal events. An example of a relative temporal dependency is "task tw j can start its execution only 24hrs after the completion of task tw k ."
Color Timed Petri Net (CTPN) Model
For modeling work ow dependencies as well as the associated security attributes, we use a combination of two extended Petri net models { colored and timed Petri nets 43, 26, 19] { to construct a Color Timed Petri Net (CTPN) Model. For a brief overview of a general Petri Net, readers may refer to appendix A. In the following, we formally develop CTP.
The following de nes a time set and a time interval.
De nition 3.1 We represent a token in place p as (v; x) where v 2 C(m(p)) represents the color of the token and x represents its timestamp such that x 2 T . Whenever a token moves from one place to another through a red transition, its timestamp is modi ed to the ring time of the transition.
The above de nition dictates that each token has a color which is de ned in the color set . Each place has a color set (i.e., denoted as C(p)) attached to it which speci es the set of allowable colors of the tokens to enter the place. For a token to reside in a place, it must satisfy that the color of token is a member in the color set of the place. Each arc f(p; t) or f(t; p) is associated with a color set such that this set is contained in the multi-sets of C(p).
Marking of a place m(p) is expressed as a set of tokens with respect to distinct colors. For example, a a + b a + 2b but a + 2b 6 a + b + c 8 Here \+" and \-" are sum and di erence operations, respectively. e.g., 2a -a = a, and (a+b) + a = 2a+b A transition t i is enabled only if all of its input places p j contain at least as many available tokens of the type as that speci ed in the arc function E f(p j ;t i ) of the corresponding f(p j ; t i ).
The delay associated with a place represents minimum m (p) and maximum M (p) delay a token is required to remain in that place after its arrival. The delay can be a constant d where m (p) = M (p). A token is said to be available only after the delay D(p j ) has elapsed. On the other hand, the time interval associated with a transition states that it can re only during this interval, irrespective of the tokens' timestamps in its input places. A transition is said to be enabled only if each of its input places has an available token.
A transition t i res only if its enabling time falls within the speci ed time interval IN(t i ). When more than one input place exists, the transition res after the maximum delay of all the input places has elapsed. 9 Both the time interval and delay can be speci ed as variables instead of xed values. Upon ring, a transition t i consumes as many tokens of colors from each of its input places p j as those speci ed in the corresponding E f(p j ;t i ) and deposits as many tokens with speci ed colors into each output place p k as those speci ed in the corresponding E f(t i ;p k ) . That is, the arc function of f(p k ; t i ) speci es the number of tokens of speci ed colors to be removed from p j when t i res, and the arc function f(t i ; p k ) speci es the number of tokens of speci ed colors to be inserted into p k when t i res.
As an example, consider the CTPN shown in gure 1(a). Assume there are two places p 1 and p 2 and a transition t 1 as shown in gure 1 such that the color sets of p 1 and p 2 are C(p 1 ) = fhai; hbi;hcig and C(p 2 ) = fhdig, respectively. The delay associated with p 1 , i.e., with the two arcs f(p 1 ; t 1 ) and f(t 1 ; p 2 ) are E f(p 1 ;t 1 ) = hai+hbi and E f(t 1 ;p 2 ) = hdi meaning that enabling t 1 needs both tokens of hai and hbi and ring t 1 produces a token of color hdi. The corresponding CTPN is shown in gure 1(a). Transition t 1 is enabled at time 7 because the maximum timestamp of all the tokens in p 1 is 4 and the time delay of p 1 is 3. Since E f(p 1 ;t 1 ) m(p 1 ) (i.e., hai + hbi hai + hbi + hci) and the enabled time is within IN(t i ), t 1 is enabled. When t 1 res, one token of each color hai and hbi are removed from p 1 , and according to E f(t 1 ;p 2 ) one token of color hdi with timestamp = 7 is deposited in p 2 .
The resulting CTPN is shown in gure 1(b). (<a>,1) ** ** if a color set contains only a single color, the {} can be ommited . i.e., {<d>} =<d> [4, 8] 
Petri Net Representation of Control Flow Dependencies
PN representation of the control-ow dependency is shown in gure 3. We add a bu er state b ij x which has an input arc from st i (or t i in gure 3) and an output arc from b ij x to st j (or t j in gure 3). Here, tasks tw i and tw j move from states st i?1 and st j?1 to st i and st j when the events t i and t j occur (or transitions t i and t j re), respectively. Let us inspect how the control ow dependency can be enforced with this PN model.
Before task tw i enters state st i (or before the ring of t i ), b ij x is not marked, and therefore prevents ring of transition t j (or task tw j to enter st j ) by disabling it. However, when task tw i enters state st i with the ring of transition t i , one token is deposited in both st i and b ij x. At this point, transition t j res because both of its input places are marked. Thus, task tw j is allowed to enter state st j only if task tw i enters state st i . There are two reasons for using a bu er state b ij x instead of directly connecting st i to st j via a transition.
(1) It ensures that once tw i enters st i , tw j can enter st j whenever tw j is ready to enter st j (i.e. when t j is enabled). On the other hand, using a transition to directly connect st i to st j , gives a di erent interpretation that tw j must enter st j when tw i enters st i , which is an incorrect representation of the original dependency. Although the PN representation of various types of control ow dependencies can be constructed from the general case shown in gure 3, some types need modi cation. We refer to 5] for the PN representation of each type of control-ow dependency.
Petri Net Representation of Value Dependencies
To model the value dependency, we rst assume that the various values of a task can be grouped into a set of mutually exclusive categories or states (e.g., 0 for failure and 1 for success with the semantics of success and failure being dependent on the problem at hand). We extend our representation of a task in PN to include a set of value states in addition to the execution, commit, and abort states. As shown in gure 4, each possible value would then be represented by a place with a transition linking from the commit state to the value state. The ring of these transitions (i.e., e i1 ; : : :; e in ) depends on the result of the task. We introduce a bu er b ij v between the appropriate values of tasks tw i and tw j involved in the dependency.
We omit here a rigorous discussion but provide a brief idea about how evaluation of the conditions on arcs can be performed. The idea is to CTPN to model these di erent values, i.e., we assign distinct colors to these categories and assign these colors to places, tokens, and arcs. A token representing the result of the task is assigned an appropriate color based on its value. This colored token will then be routed along di erent arcs based on the arc function that speci es the expected colors of tokens. So the relevant transition is enabled only if its input place contains a token of the speci ed color. Thus, ring of any of these transitions (i.e., e i1 ; : : :; e in ) depends on the result of the task. For example, to model value dependency stated in section 2.1.2, we assign two distinct colors to the two outcomes (e.g., the temperature over 95 0 F is assigned green and the temperature lower than or equal to 95 0 is assigned red). The arcs functions are then speci ed as follows: E f(cm i ;e i1 ) = hgreeni and E f(cm i ;e i2 ) = hredi so that the routing of the token and ring of t j or t k depends on the outcome (see gure 5). Note that task dependencies may occur as a combination of both control ow and value dependencies. 
Petri Net Representation of External Dependencies
The absolute and relative temporal information requires di erent forms of representation in a Petri net. A relative external dependency is represented as a delay function D(p) = m (p), M (p)] associated with a bu er place p. For instance, 3, 6] represents at least 3 time unit (TU) but no longer than 6 TU. 5,] denotes at least 5 TU. 3 along means a constant 3 TU. Since the actual time during which the token is available depends on its timestamp, this delay represents a relative time interval. On the other hand, to represent absolute time interval, CTPN associates a time interval l i ; u i ] to a transition t i (normally it is associated to both begin and commit transitions). This time interval states that a transition can re only during this interval, irrespective of the tokens' timestamps in its input places, and therefore, this interval represents an absolute dependency. Both types of external dependencies are shown in gure 6. Enforcing Mandatory security in work ows calls for addressing all aspects of execution of a work ow, which include: (1) enforcing all task dependencies, (2) assuring correct execution of interleaved work ow transactions, and (3) ensuring that the work ow terminates in one of the prede ned acceptable states. In this paper, we address only the rst issue and give an insight into how the third issue can be addressed, but do not discuss the second issue.
Task Dependencies in a Multilevel Secure Work ow
In a multilevel secure work ow, a work ow transaction may consist of tasks of di erent security levels. Thus, task dependencies can be distinguished as follows. The task dependency among the tasks of the same security level is referred to as intra-level dependency and that among the tasks of di erent security levels as inter-level dependency. Since intra-level dependencies by themselves cannot violate any multilevel security constraints and are no di erent from the task dependencies in a non-secure environment, hereafter we concentrate only on inter-level dependencies. We further divide inter-level dependencies into two categories: high-to-low 10 and low-to-high since their treatment has to be di erent in an MLS environment because of its \no downward information ow" requirement.
In the following, we provide an example of a multilevel secure work ow transaction. Although we use the term high-to-low, this dependency also includes those among two incomparable security levels. compute the number of hours worked by an employee (h) which is the sum of regular hours worked (n) and overtime hours worked (o) by the employee during that week. Task tw 2 : calculate the weekly pay of an employee (p) by multiplying h with the hourly rate of the employee (r). Task tw 3 : after computing the pay for the week, reset h; n and o to zero. The following task dependencies exist among tw 1 ; tw 2 as shown in gure 7. Moreover, the information about hourly rate (r) and weekly pay (p) are considered sensitive, and therefore are classi ed high, while the rest of the information is classi ed low. According to the two BLP restrictions, since tw 1 and tw 3 write objects at level low (h; n and o) they must be low tasks, and since tw 2 reads the high object (r) and writes the high object (p), it must be a high task. Therefore, both tw 1 bc ?! tw 2 and tw 2 bc ?! tw 3 are inter-level dependencies where the former is a low-to-high and the latter high-to-low. Enforcing a low-to-high dependency will not result in violation of security. However, a covert channel may be established while enforcing a high-to-low dependency. To deal with this situation, one may take one of the following approaches.
1. Fully Secure -Fully Correct: This calls for complete elimination of covert channels, yet enforcing all dependencies. This is the most desirable case.
2. Fully Secure -Partially Correct: An MLS work ow execution is said to be fully secure and partially correct if it is secure but does not enforce all the task dependencies. This requires complete elimination of all covert channels, however one need not enforce all the task dependencies.
3. Partially Secure -Fully Correct: An MLS work ow execution is said to be partially secure and fully correct if it enforces all the task dependencies but may allow a low bandwidth covert channel. This can be done by reducing the bandwidth of the covert channel.
4. Fully Correct: An MLS work ow execution is said to be fully correct, if it enforces all the task dependencies irrespective of the security levels of the involved tasks. In this case, all task dependencies are enforced at the cost of compromising security. Although it is desirable to have the rst, it is di cult to achieve due to the inherent con icts between security and correctness. In this paper we take the second approach. That is, we eliminate all task dependencies that violate security. In other words, we prevent all high-to-low dependencies.
Preventing high-to-low dependencies
In this section, we show how we can prevent task dependencies that violate security. To accomplish this, rst we must represent every type of task dependency as a PN.
A Secure Petri Net (SPN) Model
In this section, we show how CTPN can be used to model MLS work ows by incorporating multilevel secure constraints. We call the modi ed CTPN, a Secure Petri Net (SPN). Since a task is assigned the security level of the subject initiating it, all the places corresponding to the task assume the level of the subject. In SPN, each security level is represented by a distinct color. Formally, suppose L = fl 1 ; l 2 ; : : :l n g is a nite set security levels, then L ! . Thus, each token is assigned a color to represent the security level of the object identi ed by the token, and each place a color to represent its security level. We use l(p i ) to denote the color of place p i (i.e., the security level of the task) and l(m(p i )) to denote the color of the token.
Since we allow only one color to each place representing the states of the task, from item 3 of de nition 3.2, the following security constraint is enforced.
A token m(p i ) is allowed to reside in place p i only if l(m(p i )) = l(p i ).
A Mechanism to prevent high-to-low dependencies:
In this section, we present a mechanism that can automatically detect and prevent all highto-low control ow dependencies. First we show how a control ow dependency can be represented in SPN. Suppose tw i x ?! tw j (where x denotes the type of dependency such as bc, sc, etc..) is a control ow dependency where l i and l j represent the security levels of tw i and tw j , respectively. We introduce the following notation to conveniently represent some arc functions and place set. In the above notation, fl i g denotes the set of all security levels that are lower than or equal to l i . Similarly, fl 6 i g denotes the set of all security levels that are not higher than or equal to l i . fl i ] l j g represents the set of all security levels that are lower than both l i and l j including l i and l j . For instance, if we consider the security lattice shown in gure 9, fmid2 g = flow; mid2g, fmid1 6 g = flow; mid2g, and fmid1]mid2g = flow; mid1; mid2g. Figure 8 shows how a control-ow dependency tw i x ?! tw j (where l(tw i ) = l i and l(tw j ) = l j ) can be represented in SPN. We add an additional bu er places b ij x 0 such that l(b ij x 0 ) = l(tw j ), and a transition t ij x which connects two bu er places. The color set associated with the arcs and bu er places are also shown in gure 8. If the number of security levels is nite, these sets can be converted into a nite number of parallel arcs. Figure 10 shows an equivalent representation of gure 8 for a security lattice in gure 9.
This mechanism works as follows: 1. Suppose l i l j . Since b ij x 0 is initially marked with a token such that l(m(b ij x 0 ) = l j and E f(b ij x 0 ;t ij x) does not contain l j , t ij x is not enabled. Thus a token can be deposited in b ij x only through the ring of t i . That is, if l i l j , t j can be enabled only by a token from tw i . In other words, the dependency tw i x ?! tw j is enforced if it is low-to-high or intra-level.
2. Suppose l i 6 l j . In this case, t ij x res and the token m(b ij x 0 ) will be moved from b ij x 0 to b ij x with a security level l j because E f(b ij x;t ij x) contains l j . This will then enable t j since l(m(b ij x)) = l j Even if t i res and deposits a token of level l i in b ij x, it cannot contribute to the ring of t j because l i is not in E f(b ij x;t j ) . Because t j can only be enabled with a token via the ring of t ij x but not from t i , the dependency is not enforced. In other words, tw j is processed independently. That is, the dependency tw i x ?! tw j is not enforced if it is high-to-low (same is true even if l i and l j are incomparable). We note here that the above mechanism can be attached in a similar manner to the PN model of value and external dependencies. 
Execution of MLS Work ows
Execution of a work ow transaction involves submitting tasks to the work ow management system (WFMS) while ensuring all the task dependencies being preserved. Algorithms depicted in gure 11 and 12 show how this can be accomplished. Algorithm 4.1 works as follows:
Step 1 constructs SPN.
Step 2 (a), (b) and (c) construct the dependencies, the covert channel free mechanism and associate the relevant security levels as the color set of the places and arcs, respectively. Algorithm 4.2 works as follows: Step 1 initializes SPN by marking with tokens in the appropriate places. Once the places are initialized, execution of the work ow proceeds.
Step 2 enumerates the necessary steps to enforcing the ring rules. It is important to note that these algorithms can also be used to execute concurrent work ows with little modi cation. Our model is helpful when scheduling work ow transactions concurrently, especially when transactions are ad hoc in nature. The SPN of each newly submitted transaction can simply be added to the existing SPN of the currently executing work ows. While in this section we have presented our approach to enforcing mandatory security in work ow management systems, in the following section, we present a model to enforce discretionary security.
Enforcing Discretionary Security in Work ows
A suitable authorization model for work ows must ensure that authorization is granted only when the task starts and revoked as soon as the task nishes. Otherwise, a subject may possess authorization for time periods longer than required, which may compromise security.
Although models exist that allow speci cation of authorizations associated with a time interval, they are not suitable for work ow environments. For example, recently, an authorization model to represent temporal privileges has been proposed by Bertino et al. 8] . It allows authorizations to be speci ed on objects for speci ed time intervals. In this model a temporal authorization is speci ed as (time, auth), where time = t b , t e ] is a time interval, and auth = (s,o,m,pn,g) is an authorization. Here t b and t e represent the beginning and ending time during which auth is valid, s represents the subject, o the object, m the privilege, pn whether negative or positive authorization, and g the grantor of the authorization.
Since, in this model, authorization is granted during a prede ned and xed time interval, it is not suitable when dealing with work ows because appropriate authorizations should be granted or revoked synchronously with the starting and ending of a task. This is because it is di cult to predict the actual execution time of each task in many work ows and therefore not possible to determine their time interval in advance.
For example, imagine the following scenario: Suppose an authorization for relevant Even if one can determine the temporal interval during which a task has to be executed, delays experienced by one task may propagate to subsequent tasks thereby delaying their execution. Thus by the time the task actually starts, the required authorization may expire. On the other hand, it is not practical for a security administrator to monitor the work ow and grant (or revoke) authorizations accordingly. Although no formal authorization models exist that can synchronize authorization ow with the work ow, in some commercial Work ow Management Systems (WFMSs) such as Lotus Notes, this can be simulated by embedding script that tests for the completion of the task and thereby revoke authorizations for individuals who have performed the task.
Bertino In addition to synchronizing the authorization ow with the work ow, there are several other desirable features that a suitable work ow authorization model must possess. We take a concrete example to illustrate these features.
Example 5.1 Consider a work ow that represents the selection process of research papers for a conference. This work ow consists of a number of tasks including collection of papers from the authors, distribution of papers to selected reviewers, generation of the reviews, summarizing all the reviews, forwarding the summary and decision of the conference chair to the authors and then nally announcing the list of selected papers to the research community. Assume that three individuals are required to review each paper. Authors are given privileges to create objects thereby anybody can submit a paper to the conference by creating an object. Authors will have read and write privileges on their paper although the write privilege is associated with a time limit since it has to be revoked after the deadline for submission of the papers. The conference chair then selects the reviewers. Though anyone among the set of reviewers may play the role of a reviewer, for any given paper, the three reviewers have to be di erent individuals and they must not be the authors of the paper. Reviewers send their responses by creating an object on which only read privilege has to be given to the conference chair. The conference chair then produces a summary of all the three reviews which is accessible only to the chair and the authors of the paper at which point authors are given back the write privileges on the paper. The nal decision as to whether the paper has been accepted or rejected is produced and the list of accepted papers will be created by the conference chair, and this object is public and anyone can gain read privileges on this object. This work ow has been depicted in gure 13.
As seen from the example above, a work ow authorization model should support the following features. We explain below why these are required with the above example. 1. Authorizations have to be granted to subjects only during the execution of the task and must be revoked immediately after the completion of the task. This is required to guarantee that an author cannot modify the paper after submitting it to the conference chair. 2. Capability to handle temporal constraints is required to express conditions such as a reviewer must return the reviews by May 1996. 3. A role-based authorization is required to express an authorization such as \anyone in the program committee may act as a reviewer." 4. Separation of duties, which is necessary to prevent a single person providing all the three reviews on a paper, or an author of the paper reviewing his/her own paper. 5. Event-based authorization is required because the paper has to be made public and anyone can gain read access on the paper only if it is accepted for publication. Otherwise, the author(s) gain all the privileges on the paper. In other words, authorizations on objects and tasks may depend on the outcome of a task (such as its success or failure, or even the value of the outcome of the task).
Work ow Authorization Model (WAM)
The proposed Work ow Authorization Model (WAM) can dynamically change the time interval during which the authorization is valid. By the term dynamic, we mean that the time interval associated with the required authorization to perform a task changes according to the time during which the task actually executes. WAM uses the notion of an Authorization Template (AT) which speci es the static parameters of the authorization that can be de ned during the design of the work ow. ATs are attached to tasks. When the task starts execution, its AT(s) is used to derive the actual authorization. We present WAM and show how synchronization of authorization ow and work ow can be achieved. Most work ows can be perceived as coordinated execution of tasks that involve processing of relevant objects by subjects (either humans or programs). Thus one can imagine every task starts when one or more objects arrive to the task for processing, and when the task nishes these objects leave. For example, consider the work ow of check processing consisting of three tasks: (1) preparation, (2) approval and (3) issue of the check. For the second task, i.e., check approval, to start, the object (check) has to be sent from the previous task (i.e., check preparation). When the approval task nishes, the approved check has to be sent to the following task, i.e., check issuing. Therefore, we assume a task starts only when one or more objects arrive to the task and when it nishes one or more objects leave the task. If there exists no such object moving from one task to the other, then one can assume the signal which acts as an input to trigger the starting of the task as an object.
Processing of a task involves accessing certain objects by certain subjects with certain privileges. To execute a task tw i , relevant privileges on required objects have to be granted to appropriate subjects. In this section, we develop several de nitions to construct WAM. 2 Here l i ; u i ] specify temporal constraints stating the lower and upper bounds of the time interval during which a task is allowed to be executed. As an example, a temporal constraint may be speci ed as follows: \a task for preparing a check must be started after 2 Whenever a task is executed, a task-instance will be generated. Thus, a task tw i may generate several tw-inst i 's. s i and f i in the above de nition indicate the time at which that particular task-instance has started and nished execution, respectively, whereas l i ; u i ] represent the time during which the task must be executed. In the de nition for AT(tw i ) (i) says that only subject s i is allowed to execute task tw i , (ii) dictates that only objects of type i can be processed by tw i thus the object hole ( i ; ?) allows objects of only type i to be lled in, and (iii) says that s i requires a privilege pr i on the objects that arrive at tw i for processing.
Authorization templates are attached to the tasks in a work ow.
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A task tw i may have more than one authorization template attached to it. More ATs are required in cases where there are more than one type of object to be processed, or more than one subject is required to perform the processing.
To distinguish the subjects and privileges in AT from those in A, we often use s(AT) and pr(AT).
An authorization template allows us to specify rules such as \A subject John is allowed to perform check preparation." These can actually be stated during the design process by the work ow designer. However, the authorization to prepare the check is granted to John only when the task of check preparation actually starts. And this privilege will be revoked when this task is completed. The following authorization derivation rule ensures this.
De nition 5. 2 We explain below how authorizations are derived from the authorization templates. Suppose a work ow consists of two tasks tw i and tw j . Also suppose there exists a temporal constraint on tw i which states that tw i must be executed only during the time interval l i ; u i ]. Assume executing tw i involves processing and therefore accessing object o which is of type i . To start tw i , an object o of type i is rst sent as an input to tw i . 12 After completing the execution, tw i passes object o to the next task tw j . The authorization templates associated with tw i and tw j are: AT(tw i ) = (s i ; ( i ; ?); pr i ) and AT(tw j ) = (s j ; ( j ; ?); pr j ) (in this case i may equal j ).
Execution of tw i starts when o arrives to tw i . Let this time be a i . If a i is within the speci ed time interval l i ; u i ] then tw i will be started, and the object hole in the 11 The notion of templates can also be found in systems such as Hydra 47] where a template is de ned as (type, required-rights). This is used to generate a new capability for an object by checking the type and rights speci ed in the template with its type and existing capability. Our notion of authorization template is di erent from that is Hydra in the sense that it grants a new authorization to a subject on the speci ed object if the object's type is same as that speci ed in the template. authorization template is lled with o. At this point, the corresponding authorization A i is derived according to the authorization derivation rule as follows: If a i l i , then the time at which the object arrives ( a i ) is assigned to b i and s i , and the speci ed time before which the task must complete ( u i ) is assigned to e i . Assigning u i as e i is required to ensure that A i is not valid after the speci ed interval even if the task is executing beyond the upper bound speci ed in the time constraint of tw i . However, if a i < l i , then l i is assigned to both b i and s i . That is, even if the object arrives earlier than the speci ed time interval, authorization is valid only from l i but not from the time at which the object arrives. If a i > u i then the object is rejected. Thus s i is given privilege pr i on o only when tw i starts execution.
When tw i nishes its execution (say at f i ), o is passed on to tw j . Now, the object hole in the authorization template AT(tw j ) is lled with o, while that in AT(tw i ) becomes empty. If f i < u i then e i in A i is modi ed such that e i = f i . Otherwise, e i is not modi ed. Thus s i has privilege pr i on o only until f i , i.e., only during the execution of tw i and is taken away from it as soon as tw i is completed. Even if tw i does not complete by time u i , A i is valid only until u i . The validity of authorization is therefore guided by the speci ed duration. The authorization thus created showing the duration that the authorization has been granted for a particular task can be used for auditing purposes. In the following, we explain the process of deriving authorizations by taking a real example.
Example 5.2 Consider a check processing work ow, which involves the following three tasks, tw 1 ; tw 2 and tw 3 denoting prepare check, approve check and issue check, respectively. They can be expressed as follows: Suppose the associated subjects for performing these processes are John, Mary, and Ken, respectively. Now, instead of granting all the required privileges for every involved sta in advance, we rst create the following authorization templates. (Appropriate authorizations to perform these tasks are not enforced until the tasks are actually processed.) AT 1 (tw 1 ) = (John, (request,-), read) AT 2 (tw 1 ) = (John, (check,-), prepare) AT(tw 2 )= (Mary, (check,-), approve) AT(tw 3 )= (Ken, (check,-), issue) Now suppose the requests for payment arrive as follows.
Request rq1 at 40 Request rq2 at 55.
Before any task starts, no one in the work ow has been granted any valid authorization. At 40, the object rq1 arrives to tw 1 . This object is lled into the authorization template AT 1 (tw 1 ) = (John, (request,-), read), thereby generating an authorization (John,rq1, read, 40, 50] However, in case of rq2, since the upper limit in tw 1 = (fread request, prepare checkg, frequestg, fcheckg, 10, 50] ) is lower than the time at which rq2 arrives at tw 1 (55) the authorization template does not generate an authorization. Thus the work ow cannot be started for rq2, and therefore, there will not be a task-instance for rq2.
For the sake of simplicity, indeed, in this example we have omitted details such as when a check is issued, it has to be assigned to an account and appropriate authorizations such as read, write (to perform debit) have to be granted on this account.
Petri net representation of WAM
In the Petri net representation of WAM, we use two distinct color sets and such that = and \ = ;, where we use to denote the types of objects and to denote the di erent privileges.
To represent WAM as a CTPN, we use the following mapping: (1) Two transitions t s and t f to represent the beginning and ending of a task, and the time at which they re denote s and f , respectively. (2) A time interval IN(t) at each t s and t f to represent the speci ed time constraint of the task ( l ; u ]). (3) A place to represent the execution state of the task tw (depicted as a circle) (4) Di erent colored tokens to represent di erent types of objects (! 1 ; ! 2 : : :), i.e., = ?. (5) A place to represent each subject (denoted as a square in the diagram), i.e., s in AT(tw). (6) Di erent colored tokens to represent di erent types of object-privilege pairs ( 1 ; 2 : : :), i.e., = ? PR. (7) A color set associated with circles (squares) to denote the allowed type of objects (object-privilege pairs) (8) An arc function of f(p; t) (where p is a circle) to represent the type of input objects to be sent to a task for execution. (9) An arc function of f(t; p) (where p is a circle) to represent the type of output objects of the task. (10) An arc function of f(p; t) (where p is a square) to represent the privileges (represented as object-privilege pairs) to be granted when a task starts. (11) An arc function of f(t; p) (where p is a square) to represent the privileges to be revoked when a task completes its execution. (12) A delay associated with the place to represent the execution time of the task (d). Note that d is associated with only places representing tasks (circles) but not subjects (squares). (13) A token (v; x) to represent the movement of objects (privileges) to and from the tasks (subjects) where v is the color of the token representing the type of the object (object-privilege pair), and x the timestamp representing the arrival time a of the object. Figure 14 shows a CTPN representation of the authorization model for a work ow consisting of two tasks tw i and tw j . The execution state of tw i and tw j are represented as two places (circles), and the subjects authorized to execute these two tasks s i and s j are represented as another two places (squares). t s i res when an object of type i arrives, thus starting tw i . A token of color i is placed in tw i and another token h i ; pr i i is placed in s i . Thus privilege is granted to s i on the object only at this point. After d i , the task completes its execution thus ring t f i . This removes the objects from tw i and place them in another place b ij since E f(t f i ;b ij ) is h i i. Here b ij represents the state after tw i nishes but before tw j starts. Firing of t f i also removes the privilege h i ; pr i i from s i , but does not deposit any token in b ij .
Extensions to the Work ow Authorization Model
In the WAM proposed in section 5.1 and its Petri net representation presented in section 5.2, we have not incorporated all the desirable features of WAM described in section 5. In this section, we will provide a brief explanation of how role-based authorizations and separation of duties can be incorporated into our model.
Most commercial Work ow Management Systems (WFMSs) such as Lotus Notes and Action Work ow enforce security based on organizational roles 31, 30, 25] . Privilege to perform a task is assigned to an organizational role rather than to human users, and human users in turn are authorized to assume prespeci ed roles. It is particularly bene cial in work ow environments to facilitate dynamic load balancing when a task can be performed by several individuals.
Let R denote a role and consists of a set of subjects that are allowed to play this role. We assume that there is some mechanism in place that assigns subjects to roles. Note that the subject in the ATs can be speci ed in terms of roles 36, 39] by replacing s with R in AT as follows: AT = ((R; ?)( ; ?);pr; l ; u ]) 13 For example, considering example 5.2 once again, the corresponding ATs are modi ed as:
AT 1 (tw 1 ) = (clerk, (request,-),read) AT 2 (tw 1 ) = (clerk, (check,-), prepare) AT(tw 2 )= (supervisor, (check,-), approve) AT(tw 3 )= (clerk, (check,-), issue)
The authorization derivation rule to derive A from AT need to be modi ed as follows.
De nition 5.6 (Authorization Derivation Rule with Roles) Given 
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This authorization rule is similar to that in de nition 5.5 except that we select a subject from the set of subjects playing the speci c role while assigning the authorizations.
Separation of duties can be incorporated by including the identity of the place (i.e. subject) to the token. That is, a token is of the form (p; vi; x) where p is the place, v is the object type and x is the current timestamp. 6 Uniform PN model for incorporating both mandatory and discretionary security
In this section, we show how both mandatory security and discretionary security can be represented as a CTPN. As described in earlier sections, while SPN aims to control the execution of MLS work ows, the CTPN representation of WAM shows how authorization ow can be synchronized with the work ow. In SPN, we have decomposed a task into primitive levels since the control-ow dependencies are speci ed on task primitives. On the other hand, since authorization assigned to a subject does not change during the execution of a task, for simplicity, we do not decompose a task into primitives. 13 Here the notion of (R; ?) is similar to that of object hole. The actual authorization is derived when this is lled by a subject.
When both mandatory and discretionary access control coexist, a task assumes the clearance level of the subject who initiates it, and whether the subject is authorized to gain access on the objects involved in executing the task are speci ed with discretionary access control rules. For representing both, we simply attach the authorization part of CTPN to SPN. That is, for a task tw i , we add a place s i to represents the subject of the task such that s i = fb i g and s i = fc i ; a i g. Also, f(b i ; s i ) = f(s i ; c i ) = f(s i ; a i ) = h i ; pr i i, f(b i ; ex i ) = f(ex i ; a i ) = f(ex i ; c i ) = h i ; l i i as shown in gure 15. Execution of a task takes the object and the security-level pair as input to the execution place ex i . Required authorizations are given to subjects by inputting the object and privilege pair. The authorization is synchronously revoked when the task terminates (either commit or abort). We associate the temporal constraint to both the begin and commit primitive and the duration to the execution state of the task (ex i ). Safety is an important property of work ows. Safety guarantees that a work ow will terminate in one of the speci ed acceptable termination states. Before attempting to execute a work ow, we need to check whether the work ow terminates in a non-acceptable state. If one cannot guarantee that a work ow will terminate in an acceptable state, we must reject such speci cations without attempting to execute the work ow. Safety of a work ow can be readily determined simply be testing for the reachability of its equivalent Petri net representation. This is because:
Safety of a work ow Reachability of its Petri net representation.
Reachability is a fundamental property for studying the dynamic properties of any system. It can be formally de ned as follows. Therefore, existing reachability analysis techniques, methods and results can be directly adapted to WAM. (A de nition for reachability is given in section 7.1.) However, it has been shown in 27] that the reachability problem, although decidable, takes at least exponential space and time.
Approaches
One may adapt one or more of the following approaches to conduct safety analysis: (1) Simulation, (2) Reachability tree, and (3) Matrix-equations.
Simulation:
Simulation is a technique to analyze a system by conducting controlled experiments. However, sometimes it is expensive and also it is not possible to use simulation to prove that the system has the desired properties because it is not a formal analysis technique.
2. Reachability tree: The basic idea behind the reachability tree is to construct a graph which contains a node for each reachable state and an arc for each possible change of the state. This is similar to unfolding the maximal state in 38] for analyzing TAM (The Typed Access Matrix Model). Since this represents all possible states, we can answer all safety questions. However, this tree can grow in nitely large even for a small PN (if they are unbounded). Therefore, appropriate reduction techniques need to be developed, such as those in 43].
3. Matrix-equations: In this approach, the dynamic behavior of a PN is captured in algebraic equations that can be represented as a matrix. Given an initial state, this technique allows us to determine whether a speci c state is reachable.
In 2], an approach based on matrix equations to test for the safety of work ows has been presented. This approach, which we brie y review below, relies on the following property of the PN.
Given a PN, if a marking M i is reachable from an initial marking M 0 , then the following equation provides a nonnegative integer solution U: M i = M 0 + AU;
(1) where A is the incidence matrix that can be derived from the PN as follows: A is an (m n) matrix such that m and n are the number of places and transitions, respectively, and each a ij = a + ij ?a ? ij where a + ij (a ? ij ) is the number of arcs from transition j to its output (input) place i.
Although this is a necessary condition for a general PN, this is a necessary and su cient condition for an acyclic PN. If the PN representation of a work ow is such that it is acyclic, then one can guarantee that M i is reachable from M 0 simply by testing whether the solution U to equation 1 is nonnegative. As part of future research we will explore techniques for conducting a formal analysis using one of the following approaches:
develop analysis techniques suitable for our proposed PN models convert the proposed PN models into PNs that already have well established analysis techniques.
For dealing with the complexity of computation, we are currently developing a PN modeling and analysis tool using a prototype software called IDEF/System Dynamics Evaluation Software (IDEF2) 12]. IDEF2 is a user interactive system that has been developed using Visual Basic.
Conclusions and Future Research
This paper has shown how both mandatory and discretionary security can be incorporated into WFMS. It has provided a formal framework, based on Petri nets (called CTPN), for modeling work ows. With respect to the issue of mandatory security, this paper has rst proposed a multilevel secure work ow transaction model and then developed a Secure Petri Net (SPN) based on CTPN that can automatically detect and prevent all the task dependencies violating security. Although this paper provides guidelines on how to use the PN analysis techniques for testing for the safety of work ow, it is not clear that how they can be applied to CTPN. As part of future work, we intend to implement CTPN and perform safety analysis of CTPN. Moreover, our approach in this paper simply eliminates all the high-to-low task dependencies since they violate security. However, one need to reexamine this statement because some high-to-low dependencies can be enforced without compromising security by using other means such as maintaining multiple versions. Moreover, some high-to-low dependencies may simply do not occur in a correct work ow speci cation. Therefore, a more careful study is required to examine the nature of these dependencies and their semantics.
With respect to the issue of discretionary access control, this paper has proposed a Work ow Authorization Model (WAM) that is capable of synchronizing the authorization ow with the work ow. However, our WAM does not take into account the various types of task dependencies among tasks; a complete model should take into account these dependencies as well. Moreover, authorizations can be passed from one subject to another by other means based on the security policy (i.e., independent of the work ow). Furthermore, support for role-based authorization and separation of duties is rudimentary in WAM. We intend to extend WAM to overcome the above limitations. Additionally, we plan to develop formal analysis techniques for WAM, as well as implement WAM to conduct analysis via simulation.
A marking may be assigned to places. If a place p is marked with a value k, we say that p is marked with k tokens. Weights may be assigned to the edges of PN, however, in this paper we use only the ordinary PN where weights of the arcs are always equal to 1.
